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COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGES DURING COALITION OPERATIONS

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGES DURING COALITION OPERATIONS

The multinational and ad hoc nature of coalition operations presents unique command and control challenges. As the leaders of many current and future coalitions, U.S. military commanders must develop an acute awareness and possess an in-depth understanding of the unique command and control challenges they will face during coalition operations. The purpose and intent of this paper is to contribute to this awareness and understanding through an **analysis** of these challenges. Historic and recent coalition operations are cited to **amplify** the relevance to each challenge. Possible solutions are provided to **assist** commanders during future coalition operations.

The unique command and control challenges confronting U.S. military commanders during coalition operations can be categorized under four main headings: National Goals and Objectives, Culture and Language, Integration and Doctrine, and Technology and Information. Although recent joint U.S. military publications provide sources of basic guidance, they fail to present adequate analysis to enhance awareness and understanding of these unique command and control challenges. There are no "text book" solutions which can be applied to meet all the unique command and control challenges. Commanders must depend on their awareness and understanding.

INTRODUCTION

U.S. forces have undergone a military metamorphosis in their ability to operate effectively in the joint arena. Procedural changes to joint doctrine and integration of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems have been the keys to this progressive evolution. Unfortunately, the progress experienced by U.S. military commanders, while conducting joint operations, has not enveloped coalition operations which continue to be "based on temporary agreements or arrangements"¹ between nations.

Since the Korean War, the United States has often provided the majority of forces in support of coalition operations. Historically, the nation with the majority of forces becomes the leader of a coalition. Unlike U.S. joint forces or standing alliance forces, coalition forces are "composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose."² The multinational and "ad hoc"³ nature of coalition forces presents unique command and control challenges.

Command and control encompasses broad responsibilities which include the "authority and direction"⁴ to influence the action of military forces. As the leader of many current and future coalitions, U.S. military commanders must develop an acute awareness and possess an in-depth understanding of the unique command and control challenges they will face during coalition operations.

The purpose and intent of this paper is to contribute to this awareness and understanding through an analysis of the major command and control challenges which confront U.S. military commanders during coalition operations. This paper is specifically organized to:

- **ANALYZE** each major command and control challenge.
- Provide examples of historic and recent coalition operations to **AMPLIFY** the relevance of each challenge.
- Present possible solutions to **ASSIST** commanders during future coalition operations.

Current U.S. joint publications provide excellent sources of basic guidance for commanders during coalition operations. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes a litany of considerations for conducting multinational operations.⁵ Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, provides seven principles for joint and multinational operations.⁶ Additionally, the "First Draft" of Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, is a textbook of generic procedures, definitions, and checklists.⁷ While these publications lay a good foundation, they fail to present an adequate analysis to enhance awareness and understanding of the unique command and control challenges confronting commanders during coalition operations. Clausewitz warns commanders to beware of "principles, rules, or even systems"⁸ which guarantee success.

CHALLENGES

The unique command and control challenges confronting U.S. military commanders during coalition operations can be categorized under four main headings.

- I. National Goals and Objectives
- II. Culture and Language
- III. Integration and Doctrine
- IV. Technology and Information

Several of the challenges confronting commanders during coalition operations are similar to the problems encountered during joint U.S. military operations. Unfortunately, because of the unique ad hoc nature of coalition operations, the same remedies cannot always be applied. The following challenges are not all inclusive; commanders may experience additional command and control challenges. Likewise, not all the challenges presented will be faced by commanders during every coalition operation.

I. National Goals and Objectives⁹

Alliances and coalitions are first and foremost political in nature, each nation's contribution is dependent on its political agenda.¹⁰ Commanders at all levels must be aware of the reasons why nation-states join a coalition. The commitment of each state to the coalition may determine the participation of their forces and what command authority may be exercised over them.

States join coalitions for a variety of reasons.

Standing alliance commitments may require states to become members of a coalition. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are required to defend other NATO nations if one is attacked.¹¹ Permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) are required to provide support for U.N. sanctioned missions.¹²

The **mutual threat of destruction** may necessitate the most unlikely states to form a coalition. During the darkest days of World War II, Winston Churchill (a staunch anti-communist), was compelled to form an alliance with the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin. Churchill compromised his personal feelings and stated: "Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid."¹³ Stalin, demonstrating his pragmatic understanding of this tenuous alliance with the imperialist Great Britain, stated: "In war, I would deal with the devil and his grandmother."¹⁴

Moral and ethical obligations can influence states to join coalitions. The unprovoked invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 and Iraq's "demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction"¹⁵ threatened world peace and provided sufficient moral reason for the United States and other nations to form a coalition against Iraq.¹⁶ In 1992, graphic pictures of helpless people starving, on television news broadcasts, influenced American opinion and prompted U.S. military participation in humanitarian coalition operations in

Somalia and Rwanda.¹⁷ During President Clinton's address to the nation on 29 November 1995, he stated: "as NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the [Bosnian Peace-Keeping] mission."¹⁸

Coalitions are not always formed for mutual defense or noble reasons. The basic human failing of **greed** can provide the impetus for joining a coalition. In 1939, Benito Mussolini, the Fascist leader of Italy, abandoned the national policy of neutrality because he was convinced that Nazi Germany would win the war. Mussolini's sole intent was to "share in the spoils."¹⁹

Nations join coalitions in order to **improve their political prestige**²⁰ within the world community. An emerging nation, seeking recognition from established world powers, may find it beneficial to participate in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations. Their contribution to sanctioned U.N. missions is more of an "investment" intended to improve their "stock" on the world market of public opinion. A truly selfish motive may underlie their overt altruistic gesture towards humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts.

U.S. military commanders must be aware of the national goals and objectives of each member state during a coalition operation. To assume that all members of a coalition possess similar reasons or positive motives for participating can lead to ineffective command and control, disintegration of the

coalition partnership, or failure to accomplish the assigned mission. In order to meet this challenge and avoid disaster, it is recommended that commanders conduct an analysis of each coalition member to determine their reasons or motives for joining a coalition. Determining each states reasons or motives for joining a coalition provides the commander valuable insight into the individual commitment of each member towards success of the mission. It also forewarns the commander of each states determination to take operational risks and not desert when the going gets tough.

Each member of a coalition ensures adherence to individual national goals and objectives by maintaining communications with their forces participating in coalition operations. Coalition partners reserve to right to prohibit their forces from participating in specific operational functions.²¹ Operational orders from coalition commanders often turn into requests which must be approved by individual national command authorities before they can be executed. U.S. military commanders must be aware that the multiple chains-of-command within a coalition can impede their ability to effectively command and control coalition forces.

II. Culture and Language

During coalition operations, U.S. military commanders are faced with cultural and language challenges which afflict every level of the coalition partnership. From the commander-in-chief (CINC) to the individual soldiers in the field,

cultural and language differences can impede effective command and control by creating misunderstanding and mistrust. As products of American society, U.S. military commanders do not have a good reputation for understanding and coping with cultural and language differences during coalition operations. Foreign nations often perceive American lack of understanding and failure to appreciate cultural and language differences as arrogance and indifference. This perception may be stronger than truth. Nevertheless, during coalition operations, U.S. military commanders must be aware that their reputation for arrogance and indifference can impair their ability to effectively command and control coalition forces. U.S. military commanders must make every effort to overcome cultural and language differences in order to create an atmosphere of **mutual understanding and trust**.

A recent example of America's reputation for cultural ineptness, affecting the ability to command and control, occurred during Operation DESERT SHIELD. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CINC, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), was confronted with extreme prejudice and concern over American intervention in the defense of Saudi Arabia. A "xenophobic kingdom fiercely devoted to keeping itself religiously and culturally pure"²² mistrusted and resented Westerners in their country. Their inhibitions were overcome only by the grave threat of invasion by Iraq.²³ General Schwarzkopf's ability to organize forces and exercise command and control was

significantly impaired during the initial stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD. At the CINC level of command, he was required to invest considerable time and energy reconciling numerous intercultural incidents until U.S. soldiers and leaders became educated on the need for cultural "sensitivity".²⁴

The cultural diversity between the Arab members of the coalition and their Western allies was a key consideration when American and Saudi leaders designed their command structure.²⁵ A parallel command structure was required to accommodate Arab coalition members who refused to serve under a Western commander.²⁶ This violation of a traditional principle of war--unity of command--²⁷ threatened the cohesion of the entire coalition.

As stated earlier, cultural differences can create challenges at every level. Perceptions of authority and social standing are crucial factors when operating in a coalition environment. The following vignettes emphasize this challenge.

During Operation DESERT SHIELD, a senior [U.S.] Special Forces NCO turned in a coalition ground-to-air radio for repair. Every week for a month, he asked if the radio was fixed. Every week the [coalition] communications officer said the radio had been repaired. It had not.... The [coalition] communications officer, when confronted with the radio itself, insisted he had not been properly asked to perform the maintenance. [The coalition officer's attitude indicated] that if the need was important, someone important would have sent the message.²⁸

In recent decades women have made significant progress in the U.S. military. Changes in American attitudes and

enforcement of civil and military laws have provided equal leadership opportunities for women. However, in cultures which remain "male-dominated", coalition partners may find it difficult to accept a woman's advice or assistance.

A female officer assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, purchasing supplies in Saudi Arabia, found shopkeepers and allied officers alike confirming everything through her driver, a junior enlisted male[!] ²⁹

Differences in language accentuate command and control challenges during coalition operations. **The inability to rapidly and succinctly communicate between coalition members impedes the command and control process.** Although U.S. military forces have trained specialists for most foreign languages, recent coalition operations in Somalia and Rwanda reveal that the number of skilled linguists is inadequate to support all contingencies.

The common practice to breach the language barrier is to exchange liaison teams with each of the coalition partners. For example, during Operation UNITED SHIELD, the withdrawal of U.N. Peace-keeping forces from Somalia, U.S. Army Special Forces units (designated as Coalition Support Teams) were assigned to Pakistani and Bangladesh ground maneuver forces. ³⁰ The overall effectiveness of the liaison exchange program is determined by the number of available skilled linguists. At lower command levels, where tactical commanders are required to exchange information, language differences continue to be a major impediment during coalition operations.

When possible, one language should be designated as the common operating language for a coalition operation. During the Korean War, the senior U.S. Military Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, directed that English become the command's operating language. Each of the 18 coalition members contributing forces was required to provide English linguists.³¹

Likewise, English was designated as the operating language during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. While significant numbers of English-speaking military personnel from the Arab coalition members enhanced the use of a single command operating language, confusion occurred which could not be anticipated. The following example epitomizes how even trained linguists are challenged during coalition operations.

One [Arab] interpreter..., when baffled by the term "brown out" (obscurity caused by blowing dust and sand), told students that U.S. helicopters used laser beams to land and thus damaged the eyes of the landing-zone party.³²

Cultural and language differences will continue to challenge the commander's ability to exercise smooth and efficient command and control during coalition operations. U.S. military commanders must be aware that a failure to adjust to cultural and language differences among the coalition members can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust. To accommodate cultural differences, it is recommended that cultural orientation classes be initiated as part of each coalition member's training before entering the theater of

operations. When practical, cultural sensitivity training should continue throughout the entire operation in order to build strong working relationships among the coalition members. If possible, a single language should be designated as the command operating language and interpreters exchanged at the lowest command levels to help reduce confusion and maximize mutual support between coalition partners.

III. Integration and Doctrine

The diversity of coalition forces coupled with the unique operational doctrine practiced by each force creates significant command and control challenges during coalition operations. Integrating coalition forces into a unified military force and developing a commonly-accepted operational doctrine is a monumental endeavor. No quick fix or simple solution exists to meet these challenges. It has taken the U.S. military over two hundred years to integrate operating forces and develop effective joint doctrine.³³

Historically, coalition forces have not been integrated. The most common approach to coalition operations has been to geographically divide the theater of operations into separate sectors for each nation. While this simple solution can prevent confusion and reduce the occurrence of fratricide, geographic segregation violates the traditional principle of war--mass--³⁴ by failing to effectively employ the coalition as a concentrated force. **Geographic segregation nullifies the synchronized impact of mutual support and threatens the**

security of coalition forces by imposing isolation.

During the early months of the Korean War, the traditional remedy of geographically segregating coalition forces proved devastating.

The virtual decimation of the Turkish brigade in the battle of Kumyangjang-Ni was a tragic instance of a tactical unit moved necessarily into a fluid battlefield that lacked the means to integrate operations with other allied ground units. The unit fought fiercely against overwhelming odds in an attempt to stem the North Korean and Chinese counteroffensive occurring in its sector. As its losses mounted and the unit reeled under unrelenting enemy attacks, it was forced to fight in isolation and remained unable to rely on Allied combat power, which was available, or to coordinate its activities with American units on its flanks.³⁵

Integration is essential for effective command and control during coalition operations. Integration of coalition forces does not imply placing soldiers from different nations shoulder-to-shoulder in the same foxhole, but rather it involves cooperation and coordination among the different nations to provide mutual support and ensure unity of effort.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM 36 nations provided forces in forming a coalition against Iraq. The traditional practice of geographically segregating coalition forces was not possible--there was insufficient land, sea, and air space for each nation to have its own operating area. To accommodate coalition partners, the U.S. military assigned liaison teams down to battalion level units in order to maintain operational coordination and ensure access to American fire support.³⁶

In order to develop cooperation and coordination among coalition members the command structure must be integrated. At the highest level, "[r]egardless of the nationality of the commander, the staff must represent the cross section of units under command."³⁷ A unified commander of a coalition and his integrated staff do far more than plan operations. They "create a seamless battlefield where friction is minimized"³⁸ for all levels of the coalition operation. A proficient integrated coalition staff can enhance command and control effectiveness by providing several essential functions.

First, an integrated coalition staff **synchronizes coalition resources**. Each member of the coalition brings myriad resources to the operation in the forms of manpower, logistics, weapons systems, operational experience, and intelligence capabilities. Their synchronization is essential in order to maximize the effectiveness of all coalition resources.

Secondly, the process of **developing mutually accepted doctrine and operational procedures is expedited** when all members of the coalition are represented at the senior command level. Rules of engagement must be coordinated to determine when and to what degree force will be used by each coalition member. Targeting procedures require explicit understanding in order to be safe and effective.

Thirdly, **standardized military terms, phrases, and acronyms must be established** by the integrated coalition

staff. Unfamiliar terms and phrases can inhibit the rapid flow of communications. Military jargon can sound like a foreign language to the uninitiated. Acronyms can create confusion among the members of a coalition. "An acronym, such as CAT, could have many meanings: Clear Air Turbulence, Crisis Action Team, Combat Aircrew Training, Confusing Airplane Terminology,..."³⁹

Lastly, an integrated coalition staff **provides arbitration for disagreements between coalition members.** Conflicts of minor and possibly major proportions are inevitable during coalition operations. A unified command with an integrated coalition staff adds a perception of legitimacy to those decisions which arbitrate disagreements between coalition members.

Integration of coalition forces requires acceptance of common operational doctrine. **Developing a set of "fundamental principles"**⁴⁰ **which guide the actions of all coalition forces is an essential element for effective command and control during coalition operations.** A coalition force operating under different doctrine and operational procedures is a command and control nightmare. The potential consequences include: inefficient use of manpower, waste of resources, confusing command structure, uncoordinated maneuver, lack of mutual support, and increased danger of fratricide. As nations join a coalition, they must be prepared to accept a common way of doing business. Creating a consensus by all

coalition partners for a common operating doctrine can become a fastidious task considering most national militaries perceive their individual doctrine to be highly effective. The traditional military principles of war serve as an excellent point of reference for establishing doctrine which will be acceptable to all coalition members.⁴¹ Coalition commanders can relate to the time-tested principles of war as a foundation for building mutually accepted doctrine. Unfortunately, time may not allow the luxury of building coalition doctrine from the ground floor. Therefore, the most efficient manner is to adopt one--or a combination of several doctrines--to create an "operating" doctrine.

As the leaders of many recent and future coalition operations, U.S. military commanders must be aware that other coalition members are often resistant to pressure from the U.S. military to accept U.S. doctrine for the entire coalition. Coalition members who contribute a small number of forces may be apprehensive about becoming "junior partners" with little voice in the coalition decision-making process.⁴²

Integrating coalition forces and developing a single operational doctrine does not ensure success during combat operations or operations other than war. "The first priority in generating coalition combat power from a conglomeration of nationally separated units is to train"⁴³ as an integrated force until coalition "units master and sustain collective warfighting skills."⁴⁴ As coalition combat and support units

train and develop proficiency as a team, coalition commanders and their staffs must exercise the coalition command and control system. "Major contributing factors that led to the success of [Operation UNITED SHIELD] was REHEARSAL, REHEARSAL, REHEARSAL."⁴⁵ **Coalition command elements and their subordinate combat and support units must be trained and exercised as a single fighting force prepared to meet any contingency during war or military operations other than war.**

The diversity of coalition forces and their individual operational doctrines present immense command and control challenges. Based on the need for mutual support, geographic segregation of units is not an acceptable solution. Recent coalition operations indicate that integration is essential for successful operations. In order to enhance the ability to effectively command and control, it is recommended that a unified command with an integrated coalition staff act as the cornerstone for future coalition operations.

IV. Technology and Information

During this century technological advancements have enhanced the means to wage war. Inventions such as the airplane, submarine, and nuclear weapons have revolutionized the ways conflicts between nations are conducted. The "late bloomer" of the technological explosion has been the means to communicate information. With the employment of satellite communication systems and the adaption of computerized data systems, the ability to rapidly exchange ever-increasing

amounts of information has grown at an exponential rate.

In support of defense requirements, modern militaries have sought to incorporate the most technologically-advanced weapons systems their nations could afford. To enhance command and control capabilities, technologically-advanced nations have developed unique and secure information systems. **The uniqueness of different weapons and information systems creates compatibility and interoperability challenges for the commander during coalition operations.**

Nation-states produce or purchase unique weapons systems to support their individual security requirements. Unlike a standing alliance--such as NATO--where standardization of weapons systems is predominant, when a coalition is formed, weapons and equipment may represent a mix ranging from the latest technological marvels to vintage weapons bordering on obsolescence.

Weapons produced by a variety of sources present employment challenges for commanders. Throughout the decades of the Cold War era, many nations procured weapons from the former Soviet Union. Today, some coalition partners possess weapons more similar to that of adversaries than to friendly members of the coalition.⁴⁶ During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the "French were having difficulty deciding what role they wanted to play in the coalition. Part of their dilemma had to do with conflicting commercial interests: France was a major seller of arms to both Saudi Arabia and Iraq."⁴⁷

The specific capabilities of a coalition member's weapons systems may determine the operational employment of their forces. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the French Chief of the Armed Forces, General Maurice Schmitt, informed General Schwarzkopf "that France [wanted] to be in on the offensive, but that he was concerned that in a head-on battle, his soldiers' lightly armored vehicles would be no match for the Iraqis' heavy Soviet tanks."⁴⁸ Based on their equipment limitations, the only practical way to integrate French forces for the operation was to assign them the mission of protecting the coalition's western flank. Weapons systems may also determine the sustainability of a coalition member. The ability to resupply ammunition and maintain weapons systems can impact on the reliability of a coalition member. U.S. military commanders must consider these factors when planning for the operational employment of coalition members.

The technological advancement of information systems is considered a force multiplier during military operations because it provides U.S. military commanders with the means to instantaneously effect command and control of assigned forces. Although U.S. military commanders enjoy the benefits of advanced information systems, many coalition members may have shortages of equipment or possess equipment that is incompatible with other coalition members. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, "the ability to communicate among coalition forces was inadequate. The shortfall was most

significant in the area of secure long-haul and air/ground communications."⁴⁹ Coalition ground forces had no organic capability to communicate with ships or aircraft. Initially they were unable to take advantage of coalition naval gunfire and close air support. U.S. military liaison teams to include: Army Special Forces, Air Force tactical air control parties, and Marine Corps air-naval gunfire liaison teams had to be assigned to coalition ground force units for the duration of the conflict.

The challenges of integrating sophisticated coalition information systems are greater than that of integrating weapons systems. Information systems, unlike weapons systems, are relatively easy to produce or inexpensive to purchase. Except for classified cryptographic equipment, there are few restrictions on the sale of information systems on the world market. The world is flooded with different types of information systems and many potential **coalition partners have information systems that are incapable of communicating with U.S. military systems.** As the probable leaders of many future coalitions, U.S. military commanders will be responsible for integrating an effective information system that is capable of transmitting and receiving voice, imagery, and data among friendly coalition members. Because of shortages of equipment or incompatible information systems, the senior coalition member may be required to provide communications equipment to other coalition members. During Operations DESERT

SHIELD/STORM, the U.S. military loaned secure telephone units (STU II, and IIIA's) to selected foreign nations.⁵⁰

Organizing and managing the coalition information system is another major command and control challenge. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM,

"Several generations of equipment and many different command and staff elements were melded. At the height of the operation, this hybrid system supported more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Additionally, more than 35,000 frequencies were managed and monitored daily to ensure radio communications nets were free of interference from other users."⁵¹

Standardization is a critical element of a coalition information system. Computer systems require common software to interface data systems. Message text formats must be standardized to ensure clarity and reduce redundancy of message traffic. Standardization for coalition air and naval forces is not difficult because they operate in international mediums, are equipped with compatible communications equipment, and practice established protocols and procedures.⁵² Conversely, ground forces information systems present the greatest standardization challenge because they possess incompatible equipment and normally operate independently using unique communication procedures.

Technology provides U.S. military commanders with "real time" intelligence information which can be assimilated from all levels of the national defense intelligence network. Based on the multinational nature of coalition operations, the amount of intelligence available is significantly increased.

However, because of national concerns for safeguarding intelligence information and the sources of information, coalition members are reluctant to exchange sensitive intelligence information. Most recently, during the U.N. sponsored coalition operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The Terms of Reference for U.S. forces prohibited "bilateral intelligence exchanges with coalition forces."⁵³

Coalition operations present a unique dilemma for military commanders. The exchange of intelligence information is necessary to support coalition operations; however, releasing intelligence information may compromise individual national security. Coalition members are well aware that today's partner may be tomorrow's adversary.

The solution to this dilemma is not readily available. U.S. military services enforce very strict security measures. Different security classifications are assigned to ensure intelligence information and sources are not compromised. During coalition operations, current U.S. military classification procedures obstruct the flow and reduce the value of essential intelligence information by restricting its access to coalition members.⁵⁴ Normally every line of message text does not require such a restrictive security classification. However, if any part of a message is classified as "SECRET/NOFORN", the message--in toto--cannot be released to coalition partners. A valuable lesson learned from a recent U.S. Atlantic Command, Joint Task Force Exercise

(AGILE PROVIDER 94), recommended placing "tear lines" on all messages.⁵⁵ Tear lines easily identify what information can be extracted from a classified message and released to coalition partners.

Valuable intelligence products, such as photo imagery, must also be shared with coalition members. A unique solution, which prevents compromise of U.S. intelligence sources or unreleasable products, is to create different information levels. In support of U.N. Operations in Somalia, the U.S. military established two levels of information.⁵⁶

Level 1: Identified intelligence information that could be shown but not retained by coalition/U.N. members.

Level 2: Identified intelligence information that was properly cleared for release to coalition/U.N. members.

Technology is a two-edged sword during coalition operations. Sophisticated weapons and information systems enhance the commander's ability to fight the enemy and to effectively command and control assigned forces. However, **the diversity of weapons and information systems challenge the commander's ability to integrate coalition forces.**

The major challenges confronting U.S. military commanders during coalition operations appear overwhelming. Although there is not a single "textbook" solution which can be applied during all coalition operations, it is appropriate and beneficial to examine one concept which was successful in meeting many of the unique command and control challenges which confront commanders during coalition operations.

During the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD:

Faced with the diversity of forces from more than 23 nations, often with unique doctrine, language, customs, religion, equipment and capabilities, [General Schwarzkopf] was aware of the operational contradictions that threatened the Coalition's vitality. To harmonize Coalition forces and achieve unity of effort the CINC created the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC did not command; it integrated the Coalition land forces into one solid effort, receiving reports, collecting data, improving the information flow, and harmonizing operational planning in areas such as host nation support, movement control, and training. The C3IC was a combined operations cornerstone, helping meld the Coalition into an effective combat force.⁵⁷

Establishing a central organization is not the panacea to solve the unique command and control challenges confronting commanders during coalition operations. An organization such as the C3IC may not be effective for integrating air and naval coalition forces. Nevertheless, military commanders should consider establishing a central organization to resolve many of the unique command and control challenges encountered during future coalition operations.

CONCLUSION

Operational progress for joint U.S. military forces continues at a steady rate. The evolution of joint doctrine and integrated C4I systems continue to ensure that all U.S. forces are "dancing to the same tune". Conversely, coalition operations are not as well choreographed because coalitions seldom have the same partners. The progress of coalition operations can best be described as "two steps forward, and one step back".

The temporary and ad hoc nature of coalition operations present unique command and control challenges. Throughout the course of this paper, the major command and control challenges of coalition operations have been **ANALYZED** in depth. To capsulize the key points of each major challenge:

- Nations join coalitions for many different reasons and motives. The **national goals and objectives** of each coalition member will determine the participation of their forces and what command authority may be exercised over them. From the command and control perspective, it is essential to understand the commitment of each nation toward success of the coalition operation.

- **Cultural and language** differences can impede effective command and control by creating misunderstanding and mistrust. U.S. military commanders must be aware that cultural sensitivity is essential for building a coalition force based on mutual trust and understanding. Adaption of a common language and the extensive use of liaison teams will improve command and control capabilities within the coalition.

- Coalition members must be integrated at all levels, especially within the senior command staff in order to ensure mutual support. A mutually accepted doctrine is essential for effective command and control. An **integrated coalition force operating under a common doctrine** must be trained and exercised in order to create a force stronger than the sum of its parts.

- New **technologies and information** systems enhance the means to conduct operations and effectively command and control forces. The compatibility and interoperability of each coalition member's weapons and information systems is a major consideration for their effective employment and command and control of the coalition force.

Historic examples from World War II and Korea along with recent coalition operations have been cited to **AMPLIFY** the relevance of each challenge. Current trends indicate that the U.S. military will continue to play a key leadership role in future coalition operations. Ten years ago who could have predicted that in 1996: Russian forces would be commanded by a U.S. Army general, serving in a U.N. sanctioned, NATO led, coalition peace-keeping operation in a place called Bosnia-Herzegovina?⁵⁸

To resolve each major command and control challenge, possible solutions were presented to **ASSIST** commanders during future coalition operations. There are no "textbook" solutions which can be applied to meet all command and control challenges. Commanders must depend on their awareness and understanding to meet the unique command and control challenges confronted during coalition operations.

NOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF) (Washington: 1995), I-9.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: 1995), GL-4.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington: 1995), GL-4.

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